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LIABLE FOR LIBEL?—THE TEXAS
SUPREME COURT’S OPINION ON
OPINIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Griffin S. Rubin*
“The truth is rarely pure and never simple.” – Oscar Wilde1
LAW professors and legal commentators seldom spare a kind wordfor the distinctive “anomalies and absurdities”2 that constitute def-amation law, as these “senseless distinctions and overly technical
rules”3 have left judges and juries “hopelessly and irretrievably con-
fused.”4 Rooted more than 1,500 years ago in the legal systems of Ger-
manic tribes and derived from centuries of Anglo-American legal
tradition,5 modern American defamation law stubbornly persists in mak-
ing little sense.6 These legal peculiarities were presented to the Texas Su-
preme Court in Dallas Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, a case involving a
heart-wrenching death and a well-intentioned newspaper column.7 While
the state supreme court correctly held that the statement in question did
not constitute actionable defamation, its attempt to resolve lingering sub-
stantive issues in Texas defamation law unnecessarily contributed to the
existing confusion and further demonstrated the intricate and profound
problems in defamation law.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2020; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, May 2017. Thank you to Professor Dale Carpenter and Professor Patricia
Heard for their guidance and suggestions throughout this process. Thank you to my friends
for being invaluable sounding boards and for their constructive criticism. And finally,
thank you to my mother and father, Sherril and Joseph Rubin, for instilling me with an
enduring desire to learn.
1. OSCAR WILDE, THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST 18 (Methuen & Co., Ltd.,
7th ed. 1915).
2. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 111, at 771 (5th ed.
1984).
3. J. Skelly Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public’s Right to Know: A National
Problem and A New Approach, 46 TEX. L. REV. 630, 643 (1968).
4. Holtzscheiter v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 506 S.E.2d 497, 514 (S.C. 1998) (Toal,
J., concurring).
5. See Van V. Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM.
L. REV. 546, 546–49 (1903); see also Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation
through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV.
1349, 1350–51 (1975) (stating that British common law defamation “transplanted into the
United States, where its complexities multiplied in the state legislatures and courts, and its
inconsistencies grew multifoliate in the variety of soils provided by federalism.”).
6. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 771; Nat Stern, The Intrinsic Character of Defama-
tory Content as Grounds for a Uniform Regime of Proving Libel, 80 MISS. L.J. 1, 4 n.9
(2010).
7. See Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 621–23 (Tex. 2018).
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On a mid-May evening in 2010, seventeen-year-old Paul Tatum was se-
verely injured when he crashed his parents’ car on the way home from a
fast-food run.8 He walked home from the crash site, started consuming
alcohol, and began “behaving erratically.”9 Soon after, Paul retrieved one
of his family’s firearms and took his own life.10 In the wake of his death,
Paul’s parents (the Tatums) purchased space in the obituary section of the
Dallas Morning News (the News) to memorialize their son.11 As stated in
the obituary, Paul died “as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile
accident.”12
One month later, the News published a piece written by columnist
Steve Blow (Blow) addressing suicide and its public stigma.13 The column
characterized suicide as the “one form of death still considered worthy of
deception.”14 While Blow did not refer to the Tatums by name, he refer-
enced Paul’s obituary and quoted the cause of death stated in the obitu-
ary.15 Blow then identified the cause of death as suicide.16 He lamented
society for “allow[ing] suicide to remain cloaked in . . . secrecy, if not
outright deception,” and explained how this secrecy leaves society
“greatly underestimating the danger there.”17 The last thing Blow wished
to do was “put guilt on the family of suicide victims,” but he argued that
more lives would be at risk if society continued “averting [its] eyes to the
reality of suicide” and failing to be honest about it.18
Paul’s parents subsequently filed suit against Blow and the News, alleg-
ing libel and libel per se.19 The News filed a motion for summary judg-
ment on several grounds, “notably that the column was not reasonably
capable of a defamatory meaning and that the column was an opinion.”20
The trial court granted the News’s motion.21 On appeal by the Tatums,
the court of appeals reversed and remanded the claims based on the libel
and libel per se theories, rejecting every possible ground on which the
8. Id. at 621.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 622; see also Paul Kaelson Tatum Obituary, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 21,
2010, at 7B.
12. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 622.
13. See Steve Blow, Shrouding Suicide in Secrecy Leaves Its Danger Unaddressed,







19. Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 622 (Tex. 2018). The Tatums
also alleged intentional infliction of emotion distress and violation of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. See Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition and Jury Demand at 6–7, Tatum
v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., No. DC1107371 (68th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex. Nov. 29,
2011), 2011 WL 13290458.
20. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 622–23.
21. Id. at 623.
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trial court might have granted summary judgment.22 The News petitioned
the Texas Supreme Court for review, and the court agreed to hear the
case.23
The Texas Supreme Court unanimously reversed the court of appeals
and reinstated the trial court’s order for summary judgment.24 The court
began its de novo review by asking whether the column, or any of its
parts, was reasonably capable of a defamatory meaning.25 To answer this
threshold question, the court made two separate inquiries: (1) what does
the column mean, and (2) is such meaning defamatory?26
The court proceeded to summarize seemingly all applicable Texas libel
law and altered conventional defamation terminology in a dense and pro-
tracted section.27 The court outlined several points about Texas defama-
tion law. First, defamation can be written, known as libel, or spoken,
known as slander.28 Second, a statement can be textual defamation, de-
famatory based simply on the text itself, or extrinsic defamation, requir-
ing reference to extrinsic circumstances.29 Third, textual defamation can
be either explicit defamation or defamation-by-implication.30 While ex-
plicit defamation occurs when what a statement says and communicates
are the same, defamation-by-implication occurs when what a statement
says and communicates differ.31 Fourth, defamation-by-implication can
occur either by its “gist” or by partial implication.32 While a publication
only has a singular gist, numerous discrete implications are possible
within a single publication.33 The standard for deriving implied meaning
from a statement is whether an objectively reasonable reader would draw
such an implication.34 Further, the plaintiff must point to “additional, af-
firmative evidence” within the publication itself that suggests the defen-
dant “intends or endorses the defamatory inference.”35
22. Id. (alteration in original); see also Tatum v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 493 S.W.3d
646, 656–74 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015), rev’d sub nom., 554 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. 2018).
23. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 623.
24. Id. at 620–21.
25. Id. at 624–25.
26. Id. Meaning is a question of law, and the inquiry into meaning is objective. Id. at
625.
27. See id. at 625–36.
28. Id. at 623; see William L. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REV. 839, 839–43
(1960).
29. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 626. For further explanation and an exam-
ple of this distinction, see Marc A. Franklin & Daniel J. Bussel, The Plaintiff’s Burden in
Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 834 (1984).
30. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 626–27.
31. Id. at 628. For further explanation and an example of this distinction, see Thomas
B. Kelley & Steven D. Zansberg, Libel by Implication, 20 COMM. LAW. 3, 9–10 (2002).
32. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 628.
33. Id. at 629. For further explanation and an example of this distinction, see C.
Thomas Dienes & Lee Levine, Implied Libel, Defamatory Meaning, and State of Mind: The
Promise of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 78 IOWA L. REV. 237, 290–92 (1993).
34. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 631; see also Transcript of Oral Argument
at 2, 4, Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. 2018) (No. 16-0098), 2018
WL 488211 (discussing the “would” versus “could” distinction).
35. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 635 (citing White v. Fraternal Order of
Police, 909 F.2d 512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also David M. Cohn, The Problem of Indi-
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In the words of Justice Boyd, “Got it?”36
The Tatums alleged that the column’s gist was implicitly defamatory.37
The court unequivocally disagreed that the column’s gist pertained to the
Tatums, maintaining the column as a whole conveyed that “our society
ought to be more forthcoming about suicide and that by failing to do so,
our society is making the problem of suicide worse, not better.”38 The
court then examined three allegedly defamatory statements derived from
the Tatums’ petition: (1) “the Tatums acted deceptively in publishing the
obituary;” (2) “Paul had a mental illness, which the Tatums ignored and
which led to Paul’s suicide; and” (3) “the Tatums’ deception perpetuates
and exacerbates the problem of suicide in others.”39 The court found that
only the first of these three implied statements would have been drawn
by an objectively reasonable reader.40
Next, the court examined whether the implied statement’s meaning
was defamatory.41 The court found the implication “reasonably capable
of impeaching the Tatums’ ‘honesty and integrity,’” and thereby “‘rea-
sonably capable’ of injuring [their] standing in the community.”42 As
such, the meaning of the publication’s implied statement was
defamatory.43
However, the court noted that even if a statement is defamatory, such
statement is not actionable under defamation law if it is unverifiable as
false or if it cannot be understood to convey a verifiable fact in the con-
text the statement was made.44 “A statement that fails either test—ver-
rect Defamation: Omission of Material Facts, Implication, and Innuendo, 1993 U. CHI. LE-
GAL F. 233, 244–46 (1993) (discussing the “capable of defamatory meaning” test applied in
the White case and other implied defamation cases).
36. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 644 (Boyd, J., concurring). The concur-
rence appears empathetic to any confusion stemming from the majority’s pronouncement
of applicable law. See id. at 644–45.
37. Id. at 636 (majority opinion).
38. Id. at 636–37.
39. Id. at 636.
40. Id. at 637. The attorney for the Tatums regularly maintained that all three discrete
implications were defamatory because the “objectively reasonable reader” would have
been someone who knew the Tatums. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Dall. Morning
News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. 2018) (No. 16-0098), 2018 WL 488211; see also
Brittany C. Solomon & Simine Vazire, Knowledge of Identity and Reputation: Do People
Have Knowledge of Others’ Perceptions?, 111 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 341,
342–44 (2016) (suggesting a difference between the way acquaintances and society as a
whole perceive an individual).
41. See Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 637.
42. Id. at 638 (alteration in original). A written statement is defamatory if it “tends to
injure a living person’s reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, con-
tempt or ridicule, . . . or to impeach any person’s honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation.”
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 73.001.
43. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 638. But see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Defa-
mation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community, 71 WASH. L. REV. 1, 36–43 (1996) (sug-
gesting that a community constructed in defamation jurisprudence is somewhat or entirely
dissimilar to the actual community in which a plaintiff’s reputation is allegedly harmed).
44. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 638 (recognizing the “joint test” outlined
in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1990)).
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ifiability or context—is called an opinion.”45 The News argued that the
statement in question failed both tests, claiming that the Tatums’ mental
state following their son’s death could not be factually verified and that
the context clearly demonstrated that the implied statement was pro-
tected because of its placement “among the opinions that the column
contains.”46 To the contrary, the Tatums insisted that the statement satis-
fied both tests, maintaining that their mental state following Paul’s death
must be verifiable,47 and that a reasonable reader would conclude that
the statement in question contextually stated a fact.48
The court held that the column’s context “manifestly discloses” that
any implication of deception by the Tatums is opinion.49 In the column,
Blow accused the Tatums of a “single, understandable act of deception,
undertaken with motives that should not incite guilt or embarrass-
ment.”50 The court reasoned that the column’s language was indicative of
a “personal viewpoint,” demonstrated by recurring phrases such as “I
think” and “I understand.”51 Moreover, the column did not imply any
previously undisclosed facts.52 The court of appeals erred in its analysis,
according to the Texas Supreme Court, by ignoring the column’s context,
instead focusing on “de-contextualized words which [the court of ap-
peals]—not Blow—emphasized.”53 In the Texas Supreme Court’s view,
the column as a whole, while including facts, argued “in support of the
opinion that . . . society ought to be more frank about suicide.”54 The
court concluded that the column is “an opinion piece through and
through,”55 and thereby did not “run afoul” of the standards governing
the law of defamation.56
While the court ultimately applied its precedent correctly, slogging
through the “unsettlingly messy” intersection of opinion and implication
doctrines in defamation law was an arduous task.57 Instead, the court
should have relied on the role that matters of public concern play in this
45. Id. Courts have struggled to develop an effective analytical process for the
fact–opinion distinction. See Robert Neal Weber, The Fact-Opinion Distinction in First
Amendment Libel Law: The Need for a Bright-Line Rule, 72 GEO. L.J. 1817, 1818 (1984).
46. See Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 638; see also Brief for Reporters Com-
mittee for Freedom of the Press as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8–12, Dall.
Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. 2018) (No. 16-0098), 2017 WL 2616476.
47. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 638 (arguing the reality cannot be “that
defamation law can ascertain a defendant’s mental state but not a plaintiff’s”).
48. Id.






55. Id. Subsequently, Justice Brown, writing for the court, addressed the defense of
truth under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 73.005(a). See id. at 640–41.
56. Id. at 641–42.
57. See Leonard M. Niehoff, Viewpoint, Opinions, Implications, and Confusions, 28
COMM. LAW. 19, 19 (2011); Arlen W. Langvardt, Media Defendants, Public Concerns, and
Public Plaintiffs: Toward Fashioning Order from Confusion in Defamation Law, 49 U.
PITT. L. REV. 91, 92–96 (1987).
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context.58 “Speech on matters of public concern is at the [core] of the
First Amendment’s . . . profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open” and is, therefore, “entitled to special protection.”59 “[S]peech deals
with a matter of public concern when it can be fairly considered as relat-
ing to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the public,” in-
cluding “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
public.”60 When speech from a media defendant is a matter of public con-
cern and the plaintiff is a private figure, “the plaintiff bear[s] the burden
of showing falsity” in a defamation suit.61
The Tatums are private figures.62 The gist of the column relates to pub-
lic health and the societal issue of suicide, undoubtedly matters of public
concern.63 Therefore, in order for a claim to succeed, sufficient evidence
needed to be presented to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the
falsity of the implication in question.64 Given what was alleged and used
as evidence at the summary judgment stage, the trial court and the Texas
Supreme Court would have been well within their right to grant a motion
for summary judgment given a lack of a genuine issue of material fact
58. See McIlvain v. Jacobs, 794 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1990) (citing Phila. Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986)); see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101
(1940) (the First Amendment “embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully all matters of public concern”).
59. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011) (alteration in original) (internal cita-
tions omitted); see Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REV.
297, 317 (1995) (“Speech on matters of public concern is of high constitutional order.”).
60. Brady v. Klentzman, 515 S.W.3d 878, 884 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Snyder, 562 U.S. at
453); see also Mark Strasser, What’s It to You: The First Amendment and Matters of Public
Concern, 77 MO. L. REV. 1083, 1084–98 (2012).
61. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 776; see William G. Hagans, Who Does the
First Amendment Protect?: Why the Plaintiff Should Bear the Burden of Any Proof in Any
Defamation Action, 26 REV. LITIG. 613, 615–19 (2007) (elaborating on the determination
of burden of proof in defamation actions).
62. See Jeffrey Omar Usman, Finding the Lost Involuntary Public Figure, 2014 UTAH
L. REV. 951, 972–75 (2014) (outlining the plaintiff classifications in defamation actions).
63. See Dall. Morning News, Inc. v. Tatum, 554 S.W.3d 614, 636–37 (Tex. 2018); see
also Hersh v. Tatum, 526 S.W.3d 462, 468 (Tex. 2017) (“Suicide prevention and awareness
relate to health, safety, and community well-being” and are “matters of public concern.”).
Both the Texas Legislature and United States Congress have repeatedly reaffirmed suicide
awareness and prevention as matters of public concern. See 42 U.S.C. § 290bb-36a (2012);
National Suicide Hotline Improvement Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-233, 132 Stat. 2424
(2018); Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 193.011; Tex. H.R. Con. Res. 40, 82nd Leg., Reg.
Sess., 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 4990; H.R. Res. 1067, 115th Congress (2018). The court of
appeals even acknowledged the prevention of suicide as a matter of public concern. See
Tatum v. Dall. Morning News, Inc., 493 S.W.3d 646, 672 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015), rev’d
sub nom., 554 S.W.3d 614 (Tex. 2018).
64. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 776. The Tatums might have responded
that even if the gist of the column pertains to a matter of public concern, the discrete
implication that they acted deceptively in publishing the obituary is not a matter of public
concern. See Tatum, 493 S.W.3d at 671–72. However, granting validity to such a claim
would contravene the First Amendment’s prohibition on chilling free speech and would
decimate the constitutional safeguard of the “unfettered interchange of ideas for the bring-
ing about of political and social changes desired by the people.” See N.Y. Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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regarding the implication’s falsity.65 Had the court taken this approach,
the outcome would have been logically simpler and judicially more
straightforward.66
In this case, the court undoubtedly struck the classic defamation bal-
ance of the First Amendment rights of a citizen and the right to reputa-
tion of another.67 But amid the considerations involved, Justice Brown
renamed existing principles ingrained in the common law of defamation
in an effort to resolve persistent problems in defamation law.68 Such ac-
tions, while admirable, appear to have muddied the already “cluttered
slate” upon which defamation law is written.69 The renaming of common
law terms of defamation was arguably nothing more than a linguistic face-
lift that fails to address the tangled web of defamation law.70
This attempt to retool defamation principles sought to answer one of
the longstanding dilemmas in defamation law—the differing contextual
usages of “defamation per se” and “defamation per quod.”71 Whether
such change sufficiently clarifies this enduring doctrinal confusion re-
mains to be seen.72 However, this attempted revision opened the Pan-
dora’s box of complications deeply rooted in American defamation law.73
Consideration is due and answers are needed to many of these founda-
tional issues within defamation law, such as the degree to which an ac-
cused defamer’s intent matters;74 the effectiveness of the economics of
defamation law in achieving its aims;75 the most effective remedy for ac-
tionable defamation;76 and the value of reforming defamation law given
65. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 776; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986).
66. See generally Amy Kristen Sanders & Holly Miller, Revitalizing Rosenbloom: The
Matter of Public Concern Standard in the Age of the Internet, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
529, 544–46 (2014).
67. See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ES-
TATE 86 (12th ed. 2016) (“States remain free to protect reputation in whatever manner
they see fit so long as they do so in ways consistent with the First Amendment.”).
68. See Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 626–28.
69. See id. at 643 (Boyd, J., concurring); see also Rodney A. Smolla, Dun and Brad-
street, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defama-
tion, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1519–23 (1987).
70. See 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION § 2.8.1 (5th ed. 2018) (stating that
the problems with common law defamation terminology are both textual and conceptual).
The concurring justices similarly questioned the efficacy of Justice Brown’s efforts. See
Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 643–45.
71. See Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 625–26 (majority opinion); see also
Brief for Belo Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Waste Mgmt. of
Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2014) (No. 12-0522),
2013 WL 6229832.
72. See Dall. Morning News, Inc., 554 S.W.3d at 626.
73. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 771–74.
74. See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1255, 1256–60 (2014).
75. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson et al., The Economics of Libel, in THE COST OF
LIBEL 21 (Everette E. Dennis & Eli M. Noam eds., 1989).
76. See, e.g., James H. Hulme, Vindicating Reputation: An Alternative to Damages as a
Remedy for Defamation, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 375, 376–77 (1981).
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the risk of unpredictable hardships in practice.77
Only time will tell how the Court’s ruling here will affect Texas defa-
mation law. But the per se–per quod defamation distinction and other
doctrinal matters will become increasingly more complicated as society’s
methods of communication undergo significant changes78 and as defama-
tion law faces new challenges unfolding in the twenty-first century.79
Modern defamation law must stop “shadow boxing”80 with its problems
and start landing substantive punches.
77. See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
487, 537–50 (1991).
78. See Frank Newport, The New Era of Communication Among Americans, GALLUP
(Nov. 10, 2014), https://news.gallup.com/poll/179288/new-era-communication-americans
.aspx.
79. See, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 68 n.37 (2014);
Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, 35 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 17, 31–42 (2011);
Elizabeth Kirley & Marilyn M. McMahon, The Emoji Factor: Humanizing the Emerging
Law of Digital Speech, 85 TENN. L. REV. 517, 557–59 (2018); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene
Volokh, Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1101–03
(2018); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & RonNell Andersen Jones, Of Reasonable Readers and
Unreasonable Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 155,
159–66 (2016).
80. See Roundtable Symposium, First Amendment on Trial—The Libel Lawyer’s Per-
spective, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 853 (2000).
